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ABSTRACT
Prior research has examined the effects of ethnic fractionalization on trust in
political institutions. However, most of the literature focuses on a general understanding of
political trust, disregarding the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and individual
trust in the legal system. I argue that high levels of ethnic fractionalization decrease trust
in the courts. To provide empirical support for my theory, I use individual-level survey
data from 32 African and Latin American countries from 2013 and I produce two findings.
First, using multiple OLS fixed effects regression analysis, I find that ethnic
fractionalization decreases trust in the courts. Second, using mediation analysis, I find that
ethnic fractionalization indirectly decreases trust in the courts through the mediation effect
of corruption. Consequently, ethnic fractionalization is essential to understanding trust in
the courts and democratic institutions in general.
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ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, CORRUPTION, AND TRUST IN THE COURTS
Introduction
The end of the Cold War brought democratization throughout the world in
countries that were not traditionally democratic. In many of the countries, there are high
levels of ethnic fractionalization. This is an issue because the extant literature suggests
that high levels of ethnic fractionalization pose challenges to favorable political and
economic outcomes (Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Habyarimana et
al., 2007). The findings on the effects of ethnic fractionalization (EF)—measured by the
probability that two randomly drawn individuals within a country do not share the same
ethnicity—on various political and economic outcomes have yielded an unfortunate yet
significant pattern regarding ethnic diversity. High levels of EF associate with increased
ethnic favoritism, higher levels of corruption, and reduced institutional performance
(Hutchison and Johnson, 2011; Lavallé et al., 2008; Newton, 2007; Touchton, 2013). In
economics, higher levels of EF have been associated with poor economic growth, lower
levels of income, and higher levels of income inequality (Chi et al., 2013; Newton, 2007;
Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). Considering these negative consequences, high levels of EF
also associate with decreased levels of political trust.
While clear implications from prior research bring to light the challenges between
high levels of diversity and political trust in general, there are no studies that examine the
effects of EF on trust in the courts and judicial systems at large. That this gap even exists
is surprising because there are studies illustrating how EF affects judicial outcomes. For
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example, prior research suggests that Arabic judges impose preferential treatment to Arab
criminal defendants in Israel (Grossman et al., 2016), while Constitutional Court judges
in Bosnia and Herzegovina conspicuously vote along clear ethnic lines (Schwartz and
Murchison, 2016). If this is the case, combined with prior findings on the effects of EF on
political institutions, EF may have a negative impact on trust in the courts. To fill this
gap, I study the effects of ethnic fractionalization on individual levels of trust in the
courts.
Thus, in this study, I particularly examine the relationship between levels of
ethnic fractionalization and individual-level trust in the courts. This undertaking is
important because it can inform policymakers of the various determinants that influence
individuals in trusting judicial institutions. By understanding the role of ethnicity in
generating trust in the legal system among citizens, judicial institutions in highly
ethnically diverse contexts can shape policy according to the particular needs of
minorities and groups that are most affected by the status quo. Finally, as a result, when
such measures generate higher levels of trust in the courts and the legal system in general,
citizens will carry over high trust and confidence into other political institutions and
democracy in general.
In this thesis, I argue that ethnic fractionalization has two primary effects on trust
in the judicial system. First, EF has a direct negative effect on trust in the courts.
Individuals in countries with higher levels of EF should exhibit lower levels of trust in
the courts because of ethnic favoritism. Ethnic favoritism is preferential treatment along
ethnic lines and it occurs, for example, when judges impose lighter sentences to criminal
defendants within the same ethnic group than to defendants in the minority ethnic groups.
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Second, EF has an indirect negative effect on trust in the courts through corruption. Prior
research suggests that high levels of EF are associated with increased corruption
(Cerqueti et al., 2012), and higher levels of corruption are associated with decreased
levels of trust in political institutions in general (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009; Lavallée et
al., 2008; Newton, 2007). In ethnically fractionalized countries, ethnic identity operates
as another motivator for corruption but along ethnic lines. For example, a judge may
disregard the law and resolve a dispute according to the wishes of the judge’s nationalist
appointing party as a favor for the appointment. As a result, I expect that corruption will
mediate the effect of EF on the courts and produce an indirect negative impact on trust.
To provide support for my expectations, I analyze 32 democratic countries from
Africa and Latin America using the Afrobarometer and the Latinobarometer individuallevel surveys from 2013. Using a multiple OLS fixed effects regression analysis, I
produce two major findings. First, I find that EF has a direct negative effect on trust in
the courts. Individuals in countries with higher levels of EF are substantially less likely to
exhibit trust in courts than individuals in less fractionalized countries. Second, EF has an
indirect negative effect on trust in the courts through a mediation effect of corruption. I
confirm findings from prior research showing that EF increases corruption and that
corruption decreases political trust, but I add to existing research by finding that EF has
an indirect effect through corruption.
In the first section, I analyze the extant literature on EF and trust in courts and
outline my theoretical expectations. Then, I describe my data, methods, and the primary
variables and hypotheses. The third section examines the results for my primary
hypothesis and meditation hypotheses. The last section concludes the paper.
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Determinants of Trust in the Courts
The current literature on individual political trust has identified several factors
that influence trust in political institutions in general. Scholars typically tend to
emphasize how various political and economic indicators—increased corruption, poor
institutional legitimacy, low national wealth, and high income inequality—tend to
negatively associate with political trust (Alesina et al., 2003; Karakoç, 2013; Keefer and
Knack, 2000; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). For example, a common finding within the
political context illustrates how corruption reduces citizens’ trust in political institutions
(Newton, 2007). When citizens perceive and experience corruption with government
authorities, they lose confidence in the political system because they operate under the
belief that bribery supersedes the law (Lavallé et al., 2008). This leads to citizens taking
matters into their own hands and resorting to self-help methods in resolving legal
disputes and obtaining access to public goods (Listhaug and Ringdal, 2008; Marien and
Hooghe, 2011). However, findings on EF and trust typically focus on a broad, general
understanding of political trust.
Another factor that could influence trust in in political institutions is ethnic
fractionalization. In examining the effects of EF, most research emphasizes how high
levels of EF tend to produce a negative outlook on the rule of law (Karakoç, 2013;
Touchton, 2013). This line of literature argues that minorities operate under the belief
that political institutions no longer represent their interests, so there is no incentive to
exhibit trust in the political system.
While previous research suggests that EF has a negative effect on trust in political
institutions in general, few studies have focused on how EF affects judicial institutions
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specifically. This is surprising given that most research focuses on how ethnicity and race
affect legal outcomes and whether diverse court composition affects sentencing in
criminal cases.1 For the former, studies illustrate how defendants within the ethnic
minority groups receive harsher sentences and are more likely to get incarcerated than
defendants in the ethnic majority group (Abrams et al., 2012; Grossman et al., 2016). For
the latter, studies have found that courts with diverse ethnic compositions vote along
obvious ethnic lines (Schwartz and Murchison, 2016). This thesis addresses this gap by
investigating the negative effects of EF on trust in the courts in Africa and Latin America.
By focusing particularly on the relationship between EF and citizens’ trust in courts, this
thesis seeks to make a theoretical contribution to existing literature on ethnic diversity
and political outcomes in the context of courts and law.
Why Trust Matters
It is generally understood that democratic institutions should consist of formal and
transparent rules that are publicly understood and respected, and that these institutions
should operate on behalf of the public good (Askvik et al., 2010; Devos et al., 2002). The
authorities that control these institutions should also refrain from using their positions of
power for personal gain. When these conditions are met, individuals tend to exhibit
greater trust in and compliance with institutions (Gibson, 1989). When individuals have

1

See Abrams (2012) and Grossman et al. (2016) for how judges within different ethnic groups sentence

criminal defendants. See also Schwartz and Murchison (2016) for general examples of ethnic favoritism in
ethnically divided societies.
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trust in these institutions, they believe that the institution, as a collective entity, is
competent, reliable, fulfills its obligation, and acts responsibly (Devos et al., 2002).
Similarly, trust in the courts is necessary for the judicial system to function. When
individuals exhibit trust in the courts it makes it easier for the legal system to function
because trust promotes popular support for the courts (Askvik et al., 2010; Marien and
Hooghe, 2011). Popular support reduces resistance to the courts and legal authorities,
making it easier to interpret and uphold the law. Additionally, trust increases the ability to
ensure that citizens comply with the law, which results in lowered transaction costs by
reducing the need for vigilante justice and extrajudicial methods of dispute resolution.
Trustworthy citizens are also more likely to support allocating public resources towards
the courts’ policy goals, reducing the costs of garnering public support (Marien and
Hooghe, 2011).
When citizens exhibit higher levels of trust and confidence in the judicial system,
courts are also more likely to abide by the democratic principles of accountability and
due process, increasing the ability to protect citizens from unrestrained executive and
enforcement agencies that exercise excessive policing authority (Bandes, 1999;
Dougherty et al., 2006). For example, Brinks (2006) provides evidence showing how
courts in Latin America that check the powers of the executive—Argentina and
Uruguay—have substantially higher police homicide prosecution rates than courts in
Brazil, where courts are less likely to uphold such prosecutions.
These positive attributes lead to increased diffuse support among citizens—
positive attitudes and beliefs towards the court’s general institutional legitimacy (Gibson
et al., 1998). Diffuse support is achieved over time through consistent positive court
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output and commitment to democratic values. The relationship can be self-reinforcing
through increased levels of trust between citizens and the judicial system, leading to
increased legitimacy (Tyler and Huo, 2002). Citizens are more likely to welcome policy
changes from institutions they perceive as legitimate than illegitimate ones (Nelson and
Gibson, 2017).
In contrast, distrustful citizens are more likely to perceive the courts as an
extension of elite power designed to subjugate them rather than institutions designed to
protect their interests (Tyler and Huo, 2002). This results in increased costs of
enforcement because courts must utilize additional enforcement mechanisms and other
agencies to improve compliance with the law (Karakoç, 2013). Classic examples of how
distrust increases costs of legal compliance are tax evasion and fraud (Marien and
Hooghe, 2011). Citizens that distrust the courts are more likely to accept illegal
permissive behavior, avoid paying taxes, and commit fraud. By evading taxes, citizens
engage in free-riding practices, which can result in lost resources for governments to use
in upholding the rule of law.
In addition, when citizens perceive the judiciary as distrustful, they are more
likely to circumvent the law and seek alternative methods to dispute resolution
(Dougherty et al., 2006; Cott, 2006: Marien and Hooghe, 2011; Tyler and Huo, 2002).
Cott (2006) elaborates this point in the context of informal institutions in Latin America.
For example, as a result of ineffective and corrupted courts in Peru, citizens formed
informal policing institutions as an alternative to Peru’s formal legal system. Such
alternative methods produced deleterious consequences, including cruel punishment,
torture, subversion for the rule of law, and death (Cott, 2006).
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Given that institutional trust is essential for the functioning of the judicial system,
it is important to identify the factors that influence institutional trust. Yet what determines
trust consists of a multitude of factors. Most previous research highlights a common set
of predictors that determine institutional trust. In particular, some studies focus on how
specific political indicators influence institutional trust, such as corruption, confidence in
political institutions, and support for democracy (Newton, 2007; Tan and Tambyah,
2011). Other studies focus on how economic indicators such as national wealth and
income inequality influence trust (Chi et al., 2013; Newton, 2007; Zmerli and Castillo,
2015). In this analysis, I break from this line of literature by specifically analyzing the
relationship of ethnic fractionalization (EF) on trust in the courts. I expect EF to have a
negative impact on trust in the courts
The Effect of Ethnic Fractionalization on the Trust in the Courts
Below, I analyze two ways in which ethnic fractionalization negatively impacts
trust in the courts. First, I analyze the direct effects of EF on trust in the courts through
ethnic favoritism. Ethnic favoritism occurs when authorities within the legal system at
large show preferential treatment towards individuals within the same ethnic group. For
example, there is extensive literature on systematic ethno-racial biases in criminal
sentencing within the U.S. legal system, where there is one large majority (Caucasian)
and multiple minority groups. In such cases, no reciprocity is required and the favoritism
need not be intentional. In contrast, the second way in which EF influences trust in the
courts is indirectly through corruption. In such cases, legal authorities show preferential
treatment to individuals within the same ethnic group but expect reciprocity through
some material means—money, favors, gifts, etc. Unlike the direct effect, the indirect
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effect through corruption is intentional and goes beyond mere favoritism. I expect that the
perceived favoritism within the judicial context increases as the number of ethnic groups
within countries increases. For the remainder of this section, I outline some examples that
highlight the distinction between the direct and indirect effects of EF on trust in the
courts.
Direct Effects of Ethnic Favoritism on Trust in the Courts
Previous research suggests that ethnic minorities cease to trust political
institutions because they operate under the belief that their interests are not adequately
represented in those institutions based on how those political institutions cater to their
needs and their individual experiences during interactions with political authorities
(Karakoç, 2013). For example, Karakoç (2013) tests whether Turkish Kurds—the ethnic
minority in Turkey—exhibit lower levels of institutional trust than the majority Turks.
The author presents evidence showing that the minority Kurds exhibit lower levels of
trust in legal institutions, the police, and the parliament than the majority Turks based on
ethnicity.2
This finding is not surprising and is common across the globe. Tan and Tambyah
(2011) present evidence illustrating that ethnic homogeneity increases institutional trust
in Confucian Asia. People in homogeneous countries, like South Korea, exhibited the
highest levels of trust because a majority of them identified with a single ethnic identity.

2

In a trust index ranging from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest), Kurds scored a 5.45 in trust for legal institutions

compared to 6.38 among Turks; 5.24 in trust for police compared to 6.57 among Turks; and 5.57 in trust for
parliament compared to 5.90 among Turks (Karakoç 2013, 100-107).
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In contrast, Vietnamese citizens were the least trusting because the majority of
individuals did not identify with any particular ethnic identity. Hutchison and Johnson
(2011) present evidence illustrating that high ethnic diversity is negatively associated
with political trust in Africa because ethnic tensions exacerbate conflict and negatively
affect regime stability. And Delhey and Newton (2005) present evidence from a global
study showing that ethnic fractionalization significantly reduces trust between people
while the homogeneous Nordic countries exhibit high levels of trust. In diverse countries,
people trust less in others based on ethnic differences. In contrast, the authors argue that
homogeneous countries exhibit higher levels of trust between individuals because people
tend to trust others that identify with the same ethnic group.
The lack of trust in the courts among minority groups is not surprising given that
judicial outcomes differ for ethnic minorities. Using panel data from appeal cases in
Israel, Grossman et al. (2016) present evidence showing that in cases where the judge and
the criminal defendant share the same ethnicity—Arab judges and defendants in Israel—
there is a 14-20% reduction in incarceration rates and a 15-26% reduction in prison
sentencing. Similar ethnic favoritism patterns emerge in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
Schwartz and Murchison (2016) elaborate this point in a study analyzing Bosnian
Constitutional Court decisions from 1997-2013. The authors present evidence showing
that judges frequently voted according to obvious ethnic lines. Focusing on linear
patterns between the petitioners and the judges, their study illustrates that ethno-national
preferences and affiliations are clear and substantial predictors of the court’s ethnic
division and behavior (Schwartz and Murchison, 2016).
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In the American context, prior research has consistently presented data illustrating
ethnic bias in sentencing practices (Abrams et al., 2012; Curry and Corral-Camacho,
2008; Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000). Steffensmeier and
Demuth (2000) present evidence illustrating that white defendants receive preferential
treatment in federal cases where judges use the federal sentencing guidelines. Using court
documents compiled by the U.S. Sentencing Commission for the years 1993-1996, the
authors find that Hispanic defendants received harsher sentences than white defendants.
Additionally, Abrams et al. (2012) provide evidence showing that ethnic minorities are
incarcerated at higher rates than whites. Finally, Dougherty et al. (2006) present evidence
showing that Hispanics and African Americans exhibit less trust in the judiciary than
Caucasians in Georgia (U.S.).
Disparaging treatment in legal outcomes generates negative citizen-level
perceptions regarding the judiciary. Using pooled cross-sectional, time-series data from
55 developing countries, Touchton (2013) presents evidence showing that high levels of
EF undermine perceptions for the rule of law. He argues that ethnic tensions may inhibit
political legitimacy and institutional credibility because political actors favor ethnic
identity over national identity and exoteric policy outcomes. Specifically, it becomes
increasingly difficult to credibly commit to the rule of law when leading political actors
within the dominant ethnic group exhibit ethnic bias at the expense of the minority
ethnicities. As a result, individuals may become less likely to have trust in judicial
institutions (Keefer and Knack, 2000). As such, as ethnic fractionalization increases, I
expect trust in the courts to decrease.
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It is important to distinguish how ethnic fractionalization operates in a context
where there is one large majority ethnic group and a few minority groups, to a context
where there are multiple minority groups without a clear majority group. In the former
case, there is clear ethnic favoritism within the judicial system, but the members of the
main ethnic group may not perceive the favoritism. Within their position of power,
members of the majority group may not be aware that they are giving preferential
treatment to members of their own ethnicity at the expense of members of the minority
group because they simply do not observe it. Thus, members of the majority ethnicity
operate under the belief that the legal system is fair and equal among all groups. As a
result, in this type of system, individuals should exhibit higher levels of trust in the
courts.
In the latter case—countries with multiple minority groups and no clear majority
group—members of all the groups can be both the beneficiary and the victim of ethnic
favoritism, meaning that most people have the opportunity to experience ethnic
favoritism at some point. As a result, most individuals in this system should exhibit
relatively low levels of trust in the courts. Therefore, I expect that higher levels of ethnic
fractionalization should negatively impact levels of trust in the courts.
One final point worth discussing is the potential effect of ethnic group size.
Though outside of the scope of this article, some research suggests that group size can
affect economic development, civil conflict, changes in policy preferences, and political
participation (Choi and Kim, 2018; Dimico, 2017; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Wimmer
et al., 2009). This line of research is beyond the study of judicial institutions. However, it
is not a large leap to expect that perceptions of fairness in the judicial system might vary
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for individuals in countries where the groups are virtually the same size in contrast to
countries where one group is severely outnumbered. Additionally, perceptions might also
vary depending on whether the minority ethnicity is the politically dominant group.
However, empirical evidence illustrating concrete patterns is mixed—some is even
conflicting (Eifert et al., 2010; Fearon et al., 2007; McCauley, 2014). As such, I leave this
point for future research.
Indirect Effects of Ethnic Favoritism on Trust in the Courts through Corruption
While EF may directly influence trust in judicial institutions, it may also have an
indirect influence on trust in the courts through its impact on corruption. As I discuss
more below, EF has a positive effect on corruption (Cerqueti et al., 2012), and corruption
has a negative effect on trust in judicial institutions (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009;
Lavallée et al., 2008; Newton, 2007). Cerqueti et al. (2012) confirm prior findings on the
positive association between EF and corruption. In ethnically diverse societies, there is
more opportunity for an increased number of bribe-takers since each ethnic group is
responsible for different regions and agencies within the political power structure. Freitag
and Bühlmann, (2009) present evidence showing that when individuals perceive political
institutions as incorruptible, they are more likely to exhibit political trust in general and
in other people. Finally, Lavallée et al. (2008) present evidence showing that individuals
in Sub-Saharan Africa that either experienced or perceived corruption exhibited
substantially lower levels of trust in political institutions because they operate under the
belief that they have to pay a premium for access to public services and that the
corruption is an indicator of institutional failure.
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Corruption, or the use of public office for personal gain, has a strong negative
impact on judicial institutions. It is not uncommon that judges, like ordinary politicians,
take bribes in the forms of money or gifts from attorneys with pending cases, rich
business owners, and members of other branches of the government (Buscaglia and
Dakolias, 1999; Wallace, 1998). In Brazil, for example, corruption was a widely common
practice across the entire judicial system prior to system-wide judicial reforms in the
early 2000’s. Corrupt courts refused to check the executive branch, leading to thousands
of extrajudicial killings of citizens by local police forces (Brinks, 2006). In some cases,
such killings were even rewarded. In Bosnia, similar patterns of corruption emerge.
Judges often accepted bribes in exchange of leniency in sentencing and granting
favorable case dispositions (IJC, 2004). In Bijeljina, a network of bribery within the
courts was uncovered. 24 judges and prosecutors engaged in collecting weekly bribes for
early release from detention, acquittals, agreements for prosecutors not to appeal cases,
and lighter sentences. The weekly bribes amounted to over $27,000.00 per week (IJC,
2004).3 When members of the judicial system use their office for personal gain, such
practices increase costs by delaying regular cases and favoring wealthy and politically
connected parties. Corruption in the courts inhibits the ability of governments to address
crime and increases costs of social development by discriminating against the poor
(Buscaglia and Dakolias, 1999; Shen et al., 2013).

3

Other examples include judges extorting court employees; money laundering; imposing lenient sentencing

to high profile drug dealers; and deliberately delaying cases in order to dismiss without a hearing (Taylor
2005; Zimmerman 2012).
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Data that illustrates cases in which ethnicity played a major role in corruption is
not as common as the direct effects cases since the distinction is not as obvious.
However, there are cases in which ethnicity played the decisive role in corruption and
reciprocity was expected—an indirect effect. In Bosnia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) referred multiple war crime cases to a lower
Cantonal Court (ICJ, 2004). The composition panel for the Cantonal Court was legally
required to represent multi-ethnicity among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Major
nationalist parties from each ethnicity appointed the judges. It was later reported that it
became obvious that there were clear agreements between certain judges and appointing
nationalist parties on the outcome of the cases. Almost all the defendants were acquitted
and those found guilty received preferential treatment evident in the lenient sentences
(IJC, 2004).
Ethnic corruption between the appointing executive party and the appointed
judges is another consequence of EF’s indirect effect on the courts. In Bosnia, judges
commonly issued orders according to approaches more favorable to their appointing
political parties (IMF, 2017). Similarly, any efforts to reform Serbia’s legal system from
the 2000’s and onwards were marred by ethnic corruption (IMF, 2017). Constant political
influence over the appointment and selection of judges was common. Collusion between
judges and the appointing party was routine since political parties constantly sought
control over the judiciary. Such measures not only evince ethnically influenced
corruption where reciprocation is obvious, but also undermine democratic principles of
judicial independence and impartiality.
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When citizens perceive and experience clear and obvious corruption within the
courts, their levels of trust decrease significantly. When individuals must bribe the courts
with money or favors to receive a favorable outcome, it becomes increasingly difficult for
them to believe that the legal system is legitimate and accountable. If money buys justice,
then what purpose does equality under the law serve? Similarly, when individuals are
victims of corruption through ethnic favoritism, it become increasingly difficult to
believe that courts operate under the democratic principles of equality under the law.
In this vein, I formulate three hypotheses. First, I expect to confirm prior findings
that show that high levels of EF increase corruption. Second, I expect to confirm prior
findings that illustrate that high levels of corruption reduce institutional trust—trust in the
courts in this case. Finally, for the mediation effect, I expect that high levels of EF should
indirectly reduce trust in the courts through mediation of corruption. To summarize my
theoretical expectations, I formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: As ethnic fractionalization increases, trust in courts decreases.
Hypothesis 2a: As ethnic fractionalization increases, corruption increases.
Hypothesis 2b: As corruption increases, trust in courts decreases.
Hypothesis 2c: Corruption partially mediates the effect of ethnic fractionalization
on trust in courts.
Data and Methods
Trust in the Courts
To test my hypotheses, I use Trust in the Courts as my dependent variable
gathered through individual-level surveys. The first survey was the Afrobarometer and it
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included 16 African democracies4 that scored at least a 6 on the POLITY IV measure.
The second survey was measured through the Latinobarometer databases from 2013. It
included 16 Latin American countries5 that also scored at least a 6 on the POLITY IV
measure. I use a multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects regression.
I selected Africa and Latin America for my analysis for multiple reasons. First, as
I go into more depth below, these surveys yield great variation on the primary variables.
The raw data show, to my surprise, that over one-third of individuals in the 16 African
countries exhibit a lot of trust in the courts. Conversely, approximately the same amount
of Latin Americans indicate that they do not trust the courts at all. Additionally, there is
great variation in ethnic fractionalization in the two regions. The African codebook lists
over 2,000 different ethnic groups for respondents to choose from and the
Latinobarometer codebook lists 7 (Afrobarometer, 2013; Latinobarometer, 2013).
Second, these surveys are some of the most commonly used within social science studies
that analyze anything from individual assets to infrastructure to political attitudes.
Finally, since the democracies in these regions are much younger than the traditional
Western democracies, I believe these regions provide ample comparative insight into the
various factors that shape how individuals perceive the courts and other democratic
institutions in general.

4

Benin; Botswana; Burundi; Cape Verde; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Malawi; Mali; Mauritius;

Namibia; Senegal; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Zambia.
5

Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Guatemala;

Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Uruguay.
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To asses trust in Africa, individuals are asked the following question: “How much
do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say:
Courts of law?” Responses consist of: “Not at all” (0), “Just a little” (1), “Somewhat” (2),
and “A lot” (3) (Afrobarometer, 2013).
Table 1

Descriptive Statistics of Trust in Courts

Survey

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Range

N

Africa

1.900

1.023

0

3

3

17899

Latin America

1.020

0.930

0

3

3

15220

In Latin America, judicial trust is measured by asking respondents the following
questions: “Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in [the
Judiciary]. Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), a little (3) or no trust (4)?”
(Latinobarometer, 2013). I recoded the answers so that higher values mean more trust and
lower values mean less trust, reflecting the responses in the Afrobarometer (0 = no trust
at all; 3 = a lot of trust). Figure 1 below displays bar histograms of the number of
observations in each survey. In Africa (left), approximately one-third of the respondents
indicated that they had “a lot” of trust in the courts. In contrast, approximately one-third
of Latin American respondents indicated that they had no trust at all in the judiciary.
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Figure 1

Trust in the Courts in Africa (left) and Latin America (right)

Ethnic Fractionalization
My key independent variable is Ethnic Fractionalization (EF). To measure EF, I
use the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF) from Harvard’s Dataverse
database (Drazanova, 2019).. The HIEF is measured by the probability that two randomly
drawn individuals within a country are not from the same ethnic group. Values closer to
zero represent countries with the lowest ethnic fractionalization while values closer to 1
represent the highest ethnically fractionalized countries (Drazanova, 2019). As such, I
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: As ethnic fractionalization increases, trust in courts decreases.
I selected this variable because it has been updated over time and is one of the
most widely used variables in the literature on ethnic diversity and political and economic
outcomes (see work cited above) (Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol,
2002). I chose not to use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) variable developed by Vogt
et al. (2015). The EPR variable is primarily used in civil conflict studies and measures
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ethnic groups’ access to state power, links to rebel organizations, and interethnic
cleavages. Though it is a reliable variable for the purposes of analyzing ethnic conflict, it
is beyond the scope of analyzing trust in the legal system.
Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for Ethnic Fractionalization

Survey

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Range

N

Africa

0.696

0.187

0.308

0.889

0.581

16

Latin America

0.427

0.181

0.158

0.639

0.481

16
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Table 3

Ethnic Fractionalization Index Across Country Samples
Survey and Country

Ethnic Fractionalization Index

Africa
Benin

0.764

Botswana

0.395

Burundi

0.308

Cape Verde

0.442

Ghana

0.736

Kenya

0.855

Lesotho

0.313

Liberia

0.889

Malawi

0.791

Mali

0.852

Mauritius

0.466

Namibia

0.760

Senegal

0.747

Sierra Leone

0.801

South Africa

0.856

Zambia

0.706

Argentina

0.158

Bolivia

0.572

Brazil

0.559

Chile

0.439

Colombia

0.639

Costa Rica

0.398

Dominican Republic

0.453

Latin America
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El Salvador

0.165

Guatemala

0.511

Honduras

0.229

Mexico

0.587

Nicaragua

0.544

Panama

0.612

Paraguay

0.179

Peru

0.618

Uruguay

0.176

Tables 2 and 3 above display descriptive statistics for ethnic fractionalization for
each survey and the ethnic fractionalization index for each country. The greater 0.269
difference in the mean in Africa indicates higher levels of ethnic diversity than in Latin
America. Additionally, the higher range in Africa suggests higher variance in EF in
Africa than in Latin America.
Within my models, I expect EF to have a direct negative effect on trust and an
indirect negative effect on trust through corruption. As such, in addition to controlling for
corruption in the OLS regression, I run a mediation analysis in R to examine the effect of
EF and corruption on trust. I expect that corruption will have a partial mediation effect
between EF and trust in the courts.
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Table 4

Corruption Perceptions Index Across Country Samples
Survey and Country

Corruption Perceptions Index

Africa
Benin

64

Botswana

36

Burundi

79

Cape Verde

42

Ghana

54

Kenya

73

Lesotho

51

Liberia

62

Malawi

63

Mali

72

Mauritius

48

Namibia

52

Senegal

59

Sierra Leone

70

South Africa

58

Zambia

62

Argentina

66

Bolivia

66

Brazil

58

Chile

29

Colombia

64

Costa Rica

47

Dominican Republic

42

Latin America
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El Salvador

62

Guatemala

71

Honduras

74

Mexico

66

Nicaragua

72

Panama

65

Paraguay

76

Peru

62

Uruguay
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To measure corruption, I use the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from
Transparency International. The CPI evaluates countries based on how corrupt a
country’s public sector is perceived to be (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013). The CPI
is a composite index, combining surveys, assessments, and polls from numerous
independent institutions that specialize in governance analysis.6 A country’s corruption
score is scaled from 0-100, where 0 indicates that a country is most corrupt and a 100
indicates that a country is perceived as very clean (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013).
Though the Afrobarometer and the Latinobarometer ask individuals questions regarding
judicial corruption and corruption in the national government, respectively, I chose the
CPI because it is a more uniform measure from a single database and it is a common used
indicator of global corruption. I used the 2013 dataset rather than a more recent one to

6

Examples of sources include the World Bank, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, African

Development Bank Governance Ratings, and Global Insight Country Ratings.
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match the years of the barometer and the HIEF surveys. I recoded the variable so higher
values mean more corrupt and lower values mean less corrupt.
Table 5

Descriptive Statistics for Corruption

Survey

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Range

N

Africa

59.35

10.57

36

79

43

16

Latin America

58.86

14.87

27

76

49

16

Tables 4 and 5 above display individual country-level corruption perceptions
index scores and descriptive statistics for corruption. Though the means in each survey
are very similar, the standard deviation in Latin America (14.87) is relatively larger than
in Africa (10.57), indicating greater variance in corruption in Latin America than in
Africa.
To test prior findings suggesting that EF is associated with corruption (Cerqueti et
al., 2012), and that high levels of corruption decrease trust in political institutions
(Lavallée et al., 2008), I formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2A: As ethnic fractionalization increases, corruption increases.
Hypothesis 2B: As corruption increases, trust in courts decreases
Finally, to test the mediation effect, I formulate the following mediation
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2C: Corruption partially mediates the effect of ethnic
fractionalization on trust in courts.

26

Corruption

Indirect
(+)

Indirect
(-)

Direct
(-)
Ethnic Fractionalization

Figure 2

Trust in the Courts

Mediation Effect Diagram

Control Variables
I control for other variables associated with trust in political institutions. First, I
control for Trust in the President and Trust in the Legislature also obtained from the two
barometer surveys. Generally, respondents that tend to indicate higher levels of trust in
the executive and legislative branches will reflect the similar levels of trust in other
institutions (Karakoç, 2013). Like the Trust in the Courts variable, trust in the executive
and the legislative branches is coded zero for no trust and three for maximum trust. I
expect that trust in the president and the legislature will positively affect trust in the
courts.
Additionally, I control for individual perceptions of Support for Democracy and
Satisfaction with Democracy. Democratic theory suggests that individuals tend to exhibit
more trust in democratic governments because of accountability restraints (Hutchison and
Johnson, 2011). In Africa, democratic support is measured by asking respondents
whether democracy is preferable to any other type of government; whether it is only
sometimes preferable to non-democracies; and whether it even matters at all what type of
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governments the respondents’ countries have (0 = doesn’t matter; 3 = democracy
preferable). Democratic satisfaction in Africa is measured by asking respondents:
“Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country?” The
answers range from 0-4 with zero indicating that the country is not a democracy while a
four indicates that the respondents are very satisfied with democracy. In Latin America, I
recoded democratic support to reflect the scale in Africa, while democratic satisfaction is
measured on a scale from 1-4—lowest satisfaction to highest satisfaction. Similarly, I
control for country-level democratic indicators. I use POLITY IV (2010) indicators to
control for democracy and the length in years of enduring democracy within the countries
(POLITY IV, 2010). The POLITY IV (2010) index categorizes countries as democracies
if they score a 6 or above. I expect that support for and satisfaction with democracy and
the level and duration of democracy will have positive effects on trust in the courts.
I also control for two economic indicators—economic satisfaction, and income
inequality. Prior research that explores levels of political or institutional trust commonly
controls for economic satisfaction because, generally, higher levels of economic
satisfaction are associated with higher political trust. Alternatively, economic hardship is
associated with political distrust (Chi et al., 2013; Helmke, 2010; Hutchison and Johnson,
2011; Karakoç, 2013; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). Both the Afrobarometer and the
Latinobarometer ask individuals how satisfied they are with the general national
economic condition in their countries.
In Africa, respondents are asked the following question: “In general, how would
you describe: The present economic condition of this country” (1= Very bad; 5 = Very
good) (Afrobarometer, 2013). In Latin America, individuals are asked the following
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question: “In general, how would you describe the country’s present economic
situation?” (Very bad = 5; Very good = 1) (Latinobarometer, 2013). I recoded the values
to reflect the Afrobarometer surveys—lower values represent “very bad” perceptions
while higher values represent “very good” perceptions. I expect that economic
satisfaction will have a positive effect on trust in courts.
I also control for Economic Hardship. In line with prior research, I expect that
individuals experiencing poverty are less likely to trust political institutions (Hutchison
and Johnson, 2011). In Africa, respondents are asked: “In general, how would you
describe: Your own present living conditions?” Answers range from 1-5 with 1 indicating
“very bad” and 5 indicating “very good”. In Latin America, respondents are asked to
evaluate their “personal current economic situation” with answers ranging from 1-5 with
1 indicating “very good” and 5 indicating “very bad”. I recoded the values to reflect the
African survey—lower values indicate poorer conditions and higher values indicate better
conditions. I expect that respondents in the higher categories will exhibit higher levels of
trust in the courts.
Similarly, countries with higher levels of income inequality exhibit lower levels
of political trust (Chi et al., 2013; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). To control for income
inequality, I use Solt’s Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). 7 A
GINI index measures income distribution in a country across income percentiles (Solt,

7

Of the 32 countries, 27 had GINI scores for 2013. To address the missing data in the five countries, I used

a country’s GINI score from the year nearest to 2013 (Lesotho 2010; Mali 2009; Mauritius 2012; Senegal
2011; and Sierra Leone 2011).
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2019). The index ranges from 0-100, where a zero indicates perfect equality and a 100
indicates perfect inequality. I expect that countries with higher levels of income
inequality will exhibit lower levels of trust.
Finally, I control for various demographic indicators—age, gender, education, and
employment. Prior studies that control for these variables have produced mixed results.
Some studies have found that older, less educated, and female respondents are more
likely to trust political institutions, while other studies have refuted that idea (Karakoç,
2013; Lavallée et al., 2008; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). I expect that employed
respondents will be more likely to trust the judiciary than those without employment and
wages.
Results
Direct Effect: Ethnic Fractionalization on Trust in the Courts
Table 6 displays the OLS regression with fixed effects for Africa and Latin
America.8 For both surveys, I find that ethnic fractionalization is significantly and
negatively associated with trust in the courts. In Africa, the results of the fixed effects
OLS regression for EF indicate a coefficient of -1.352, suggesting that, all else equal, an
increase from the least fractionalized country (Burundi, .308) to the highest fractionalized
country (Liberia, .889) decreases trust in the courts by 20%. Model 2 displays the results
for Latin America. The results suggest that, all else equal, an increase from the least
fractionalized country (Argentina, .158) to the highest fractionalized country (Colombia,
.639) decreases trust in the courts by 5.4%.

8

See Appendix for country specific data.
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Table 6

OLS Regression Results
Trust in the Courts
Model 1

Model 2

Africa

Latin America

Ethnic Fractionalization

-1.352*** (0.429)

-0.447**

(0.105)

Corruption

-0.057*** (0.004)

0.001

(0.002)

Trust in President

0.127*** (0.008)

0.126*** (0.008)

Trust in Legislature

0.286*** (0.008)

0.459*** (0.008)

Economic Satisfaction

0.014*** (0.007)

0.015*

Economic Hardship

0.013*

(0.007)

0.034*** (0.009)

GINI

-0.009*** (0.002)

0.019*** (0.006)

POLITY

0.083*** (0.020)

0.127**

(0.052)

Durability

-0.017*** (0.004)

0.006**

(0.003)

Support for Democracy

-0.001

0.019**

(0.008)

Satisfaction with Democracy

0.071*** (0.008)

0.065*** (0.008)

Age

-0.0001

(0.0005)

-0.001*** (0.008)

Sex

-0.003

(0.013)

0.019

(0.011)

(0.008)

(0.013)
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Education

-0.008*

(0.004)

0.004*** (0.002)

Employment

-0.027*

(0.015)

-0.33**

Constant

5.554*** (0.349)

(0.013)

-1.914*** (0.546)

Observations

17,899

15,220

R2

0.240

0.366

Adjusted R2

0.239

0.365

Residual Std. Error
15194)
F Statistic
25; 15194)

0.893 (df = 17873)
226.247*** (df = 25; 17873)

0.741 (df =
350.177*** (df =

==================================================================================
=========
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The fixed effects OLS regression confirms my main hypothesis (Hypothesis 1)
and the effect of EF on trust in the courts achieves statistical significance. Comparing the
two surveys, it can be inferred that the higher substantive effect in Africa is due to a
higher range of variance in ethnic fractionalization.
Control Variables
As expected, an increase in corruption has a negative effect on trust in courts in
Africa. Achieving statistical significance with a coefficient of -0.057, the results suggests
that an increase from the least corrupted country (Botswana with a value of 36) to the
highest corrupted country (Burundi with a value of 79) decreases trust in the courts by
61%. In contrast, corruption in Latin America unexpectedly has virtually no effect on
trust in the courts within the OLS regression model (.001).
As for the individual-level control variables, trust in the president and the
legislature are positively and significantly associated with trust in the courts in both
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models. In both Africa and Latin America, an increase from the least trust to the highest
trust (0-3), results in a 10% increase in trust in the courts. However, while an increase in
trust in the legislature increases trust in the courts in Africa by 21%, trust in the
legislature in Latin America increases trust in the courts by 34%.
Additionally, as expected, respondents that were satisfied with the economy and
were not experiencing economic hardship are also more likely to trust the courts. In
Africa, an increase from not being satisfied with the economy to being very satisfied (15) and moving from the worst economic hardship to a positive economic status (1-5),
increases trust in the courts by 1%. In Latin America, economic satisfaction also
increases trust in the courts by 1% while those not experiencing economic hardship are
3% more likely to exhibit trust in the courts.
Similarly, respondents that were satisfied with democracy also exhibited higher
levels of trust in the courts in both surveys. In Africa, increasing democratic satisfaction
from the least satisfied to most satisfied (0-4) resulted in a 7% increase in trust in the
courts. In Latin America, democratic satisfaction increases trust in the courts by 5%.
However, support for democracy in Africa is negatively but insignificantly associated
with trust in the courts. In contrast, support for democracy positively and strongly affects
trust in the courts in Latin America, but the increase is less than 1%.
As for the country-level indicators, as expected, income inequality is negatively
and significantly associated with trust in the courts in Africa. An increase from the
country with the least inequality (Liberia, 36.8) to the country with the highest inequality
(Namibia, 65.1) results in a 6% decrease in trust in the courts. Unexpectedly, higher
levels of income inequality positively and significantly increase trust in the courts in

33
Latin America. An increase in income inequality from the country with least inequality
(Uruguay, 36.6) to the country with the highest levels of inequality (Honduras, 48.7)
increases trust in the courts by 6%.
Democracy (polity) is positively and significantly associated with trust in the
courts in both surveys as expected with democratic theory. An increase from the least
democratic countries to the highest democratic countries results in an 8% increase in trust
in the courts in Africa and a 10% increase in trust in the courts in Latin America.
However, democratic durability (years as democracy) negatively affects trust in the
courts in Africa—a decrease by 17%—and positively affects trust in the courts in Latin
America—an increase by 12%.
Finally, in congruence with prior research, demographic variables produced
mixed results. In Africa, age and sex did not have a meaningful impact on judicial trust
while those that were more educated tended to exhibit lower levels of trust in the courts.
In Latin America, older respondents exhibited negative and significant levels of trust in
the courts while gender has no meaningful impact on the dependent variable. In contrast
to Africa, respondents with more years of education in Latin America exhibited positive
and significant levels of trust. Lastly, employed respondents exhibited negative and
significant levels of trust in the courts in both surveys.
Indirect Effect: Corruption Mediation
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), I took multiple steps to assess the effect of
ethic fractionalization on trust and the mediating effect that ethnic fractionalization has
on trust through corruption. I outline this process in Tables 7 and 9 below for Africa and
Tables 9 and 10 for Latin America.
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In Africa, the first step begins with a basic regression of ethnic fractionalization’s
direct effect on trust in the courts without the corruption variable to test for significance.
After achieving statistical significance with a coefficient of -0.439 in step one, the second
step requires a significant relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the mediating
variable—corruption. The regression results indicate that ethnic fractionalization has a
positive and statistically significant effect on corruption with a coefficient of 22.574—
confirming Hypothesis 2A. The third step consists of a regression analysis with ethnic
fractionalization as the main independent variable with the addition of corruption. The
effect of EF on trust in the courts should be smaller in magnitude than the initial effect in
step one. Here, the coefficient of EF decreased from -0.439 to -0.261 with the addition of
corruption as the mediating variable—suggesting partial mediation. Additionally, step 3
confirms Hypothesis 2B, that an increase in corruption leads to a decrease in trust in the
courts.
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Table 7

Mediation Analysis Africa

Ethnic
Fractionalization

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3:

DV: Trust in Courts

DV: Corruption

DV: Trust in Courts

-0.439***

22.574***

-0.261***

(0.041)

(0.387)

(0.044)

Corruption

-0.008***
(0.001)

Constant

2.203***

43.663***

2.547***

(0.029

(0.279)

(0.045)

===============================================================
Observations

17,899

17,899

17,899

R2

0.006

0.159

0.012

Adjusted R2

0.006

0.159

0.012

Residual Std. Error
17896)
F Statistic
17896)

1.020 (df = 17897)
116.095*** (df = 1; 17897)

9.708 (df = 17897)
3395.919*** (df = 1; 17897)

1.017 (df =
109.043*** (df = 2;

===============================================================
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, after confirming the mediation effect through regression, I ran a
bootstrapping method to produce the mediation effect results (see Table 8 below). The
Total Effect in the results (-0.439) is the total effect of ethnic fractionalization on trust in
the courts without the corruption mediator (step 1). The Average Direct Effect (ADE) of 0.261 is the direct effect of ethnic fractionalization on trust in the courts after accounting
for corruption as the mediator (step 3). Finally, the Average Causal Mediation Effects
(ACME) subtracts the direct effect from the total effect (-0.439 + 0.261 = -0.178), which
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equals to a product of a coefficient of ethnic fractionalization in step 2 and a coefficient
of corruption in step 3 (-0.0078845 x 22.5738 = -0.17798313). By obtaining this indirect
effect with statistical significance, the results confirm Hypothesis 2C, that ethnic
fractionalization reduces trust in the courts through partial mediation of corruption.
Table 8

Mediation Results Africa
Estimate

95% CI Lower

95% CI Upper

p-value

ACME

-0.178

-0.213

-0.14

0.000 ***

ADE

-0.261

-0.342

-0.17

0.000 ***

Total Effect

-0.439

-0.511

-0.36

0.000 ***

Prop. Mediated

0.406

0.303

0.53

0.000 ***

==========================================================================
===
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Sample Size Used: 17899
Simulations: 500

In Latin America (Table 9 below), the regression model achieved statistical
significance between EF and trust in courts with a coefficient of -0.178. In step 2, I
confirmed Hypothesis 2A—EF has a positive and statistically significant effect on
corruption with a coefficient of 10.888. The third step displayed a decrease in the effect
of EF from -0.178 to -0.110 when mediating through corruption. Step 3 also confirmed
Hypothesis 2B—that an increase in corruption leads to a decrease in trust in the courts.
After running a bootstrapping simulation (Table 10 below), the ACME produced a
mediation effect of -0.688, confirming Hypothesis 2C: that ethnic fractionalization
reduces trust in the courts through partial mediation of corruption.
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Table 9

Mediation Analysis Latin America

Ethnic
Fractionalization

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3:

DV: Trust in Courts

DV: Corruption

DV: Trust in Courts

-0.178***

10.188***

-0.110***

(0.042)

(0.661)

(0.042)

Corruption

-0.007***
(0.001)

Constant

1.096***

54.517***

1.464***

(0.019

(0.306)

(0.034)

==========================================================================
==
Observations

15,220

15,220

15,220

R2

0.001

0.015

0.013

Adjusted R2

0.001

0.015

0.013

Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
15217)

0.929 (df = 15218)
18.361*** (df = 1; 15218)

14.760 (df = 15218)
237.321*** (df = 1; 15218)

0.924 (df = 15217)
98.003*** (df = 2;

==================================================================================
===
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 10

Mediation Results Latin America
Estimate

95% CI Lower

95% CI Upper

p-value

ACME

-0.0688

-0.0843

-0.06

0.000 ***

ADE

-0.1095

-0.1866

-0.02

0.000
*

Total Effect

-0.1784

-0.2537

-0.10

0.000 ***

Prop. Mediated

0.3860

0.2595

0.74

0.000 ***

==========================================================================
===
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Sample Size Used: 15220
Simulations: 500

Country Examples
Exploring cross-country differences is one way future research may want to
improve our understanding of ethnic fractionalization and trust in the courts. Nonetheless,
a brief examination of some of the countries within Africa and Latin America could be
helpful in further developing how ethnic diversity affects trust. This section serves this
purpose.
Mali
The raw data indicate that Mali is has the lowest level of trust in Africa’s samples.
About 28% of the respondents expressed that they had no trust at all in the courts. The EF
index for Mali is .852, which is well above the average of .696 and near the highest level
of .889 (Liberia). Its CPI is 72, the third highest in Africa. Since its independence from
France in 1960, Mali has been in a constant state of tension: military coups, ethnic
violence, civil conflict, and phases of authoritarian rule. Of course, ethnic
fractionalization is not the causal factor of these consequences—but ethnic violence is a
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recurring issue in the country. In 2019, ethnic violence led to the collapse of Mali’s
government and the resignation of its Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga and his
cabinet. Ethnic tensions between the Dogon and the Fulani people exacerbated the ethnic
conflict and violence within the country. The Fulani were suspected of supporting
jihadists, while the Dogon group created a militia to counter the jihadist influence in the
region. In March 2019, conflict between the two groups escalated, resulting in 160
deaths. Since 2018, 600 lives have been claimed by ethnic violence (France-Presse,
2019).
It is no surprise that Mali’s respondents had the least amount of trust in the courts.
Though caution should be exercised in attributing the lack of trust to ethnic
fractionalization, Mali’s larger political context and ethnic violence plays a large role in
citizens’ attitudes. Experiences with other political arrangements typically spill over into
the judicial context. Thus, the negative consequences of ethnic fractionalization in other
contexts in Mali also affect individual levels of trust in the judicial system.
Botswana
It can be said that Botswana is the opposite case of Mali. Botswana is one of the
countries with the highest levels of trust in the courts at 42%. Additionally, Botswana is
one of the least fractionalized countries with an EF index at .395, well below the .696
average. Botswana is also the least corrupt country in the African survey with a CPI of
36, well below the 59.35 average. In political and social science literature, Botswana is
often deemed the model country in Africa in terms of democratization and development
(Samatar, 1997). Since its independence in 1966, Botswana has consistently maintained a
stable democracy, upheld the rule of law, and made many economic advancements.
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Botswana’s high levels of trust are not exclusively due to its low EF score.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that prior research suggests that one key element in
Botswana’s political and economic successes is largely due to Botswana’s policies
towards ethnic inclusion and reducing ethnic tensions (Carroll and Carroll, 1997;
Samatar, 1997; Werbner, 2002). These policies consist of promoting minority ethnicities
in small businesses and entrepreneurship opportunities; ethnically inclusive political
policies; and other economic and development policies that explicitly address problems
of ethnic tensions. Though these examples do not specifically relate to trust in the legal
system, it would be reasonable to expect how the state interests behind these policies can
be carried over to the judicial system.
Peru
In Latin America, Peru placed second as the country with the least amount of trust
in the courts. Nearly half (49%) of Peru’s citizens indicated that they had no trust at all in
the courts. Peru’s EF index ranks the second highest in the Latin American survey at
.618, well above the .427 regional average. Historically, Peru’s case is similar to that of
Mali. Peru has experienced military rule and, even with the return to democracy, there is
constant political violence, guerilla activity, and urban terrorism. Much of this has been
attributed to ethnic tensions between various Indigenous tribes. Ethnic tensions in Peru
have increased the spread of guerilla threats, political conflict, and inequality (Bourque
and Warren, 1989; Cott, 2006; Figueroa and Barrón, 2005; García, 2003; Thorp et al.,
2006).
In the judicial context, low confidence in Peru’s judicial system led multiple
Indigenous tribes to create their own informal legal systems to resolve disputes (Cott,
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2006). Though these informal institutions were initially effective in protecting against
theft and other petty criminal activity, many yielded severe punishment and cruelty in
sentencing. The long-term effects of such informal institutions undermines judicial
legitimacy and credibility. More recently, Helmke (2010) provides evidence showing that
low public support in the courts is correlated with political attacks against judges,
arbitrary removals of judges, and court packing in Peru. It is no surprise that nearly half
of Peru’s population exhibits such low levels of trust in the courts. One key element in
that observation is ethnic fractionalization.
Conclusion
My results strongly suggest that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on
trust in the courts. Additionally, EF indirectly decreases trust in the courts through the
mediation of corruption. Although cross-country differences may yield particularities in
the causal factors in the relationship between high diversity and low levels of trust in the
legal system, one implication of this study is that ethnically divided societies can focus
on ethnically inclusive policy making within the legal system and the political
institutional context in general. Future research is best at parsing out the specifics of such
policies.
By linking ethnic fractionalization to low levels of trust in the courts, this study
proposes various theoretical contributions to the literature on ethnic fractionalization and
political institutions in general. But particularly, it offers insight into the possible reasons,
i.e., ethnic favoritism, for why individuals exhibit lowers level of trust in ethnically
divided societies. In terms of ethnic fractionalization and corruption, this study confirms
prior findings of the positive association between EF and corruption, and corruption and
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low levels of institutional trust. But it also adds to this line of literature by closing the
circle between the three variables through mediation theory.
Future research may want to focus on how differences in legal traditions in the
sampled countries may influence levels of trust in the courts in the context of high ethnic
fractionalization. Touchton (2013) accounts for this variable in the context of rule of law,
but it may be valuable to an inquiry in trust in the courts. In Latin America, every country
practices the Civil Law tradition with the exception of the Republic of Guyana. In Africa,
the democratic institutions are much younger and it has a much more diverse colonial
history, legal traditions range from Common Law to Civil Law and to mixed legal
systems.
Judges in Civil Law systems enforce legislative codes and do not establish
precedent. In contrast, Common Law judges have the power to establish binding
precedents that can have a substantial impact on citizens. Theoretically, this feature
implies that judges in Civil Law systems are not as insulated and independent as
Common Law judges (Touchton, 2013). As a consequence, it is reasonable to expect that
judges in the Common Law systems are more likely to uphold the rule of law and protect
individuals because of the difficulties in overturning precedent, potentially increasing the
levels of trust in the courts—assuming that precedent is not biased against certain ethnic
groups. Future research can focus on this theoretical expectation and utilize available data
to test whether legal tradition features impact individual-level trust in the courts.
Finally, additional country-specific case-analysis could provide valuable insight
of cross-country differences since many of the countries sampled in this paper have
different ethnic groups. By taking into consideration the ethnically diverse socio-
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economic contexts across the country, policymakers could avoid overgeneralizing
institutional solutions. Country-specific studies could bring to light the social, economic,
and cultural factors that may or may not impact the ways in which individuals interact
with the courts and institutions in general.
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APPENDIX A
Country Specific Effects
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OLS Regression Results: Country Effects
Trust in the Courts
Model 1
Africa

Model 2
Latin America

Ethnic Fractionalization

-1.352*** (0.429)

-0.447**

(0.105)

Corruption

-0.057*** (0.004)

0.001

(0.002)

Trust in President

0.127***

(0.008)

0.126*** (0.008)

Trust in Legislature

0.286***

(0.008)

0.459*** (0.008)

Economic Satisfaction

0.014***

(0.007)

0.015*

Economic Hardship

0.013*

(0.007)

0.034*** (0.009)

GINI

-0.009*** (0.002)

0.019*** (0.006)

POLITY

0.083***

(0.020)

0.127**

(0.052)

Durability

-0.017*** (0.004)

0.006**

(0.003)

Support for Democracy

-0.001

(0.011)

0.019**

(0.008)

Satisfaction with Democracy

0.071***

(0.008)

0.065*** (0.008)

Age

-0.0001

(0.0005)

-0.001*** (0.008)

Sex

-0.003

(0.013)

0.019

(0.008)

(0.013)
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Education

-0.008*

(0.004)

0.004*** (0.002)

Employment

-0.027*

(0.015)

-0.33**

(0.013)

Botswana

-1.180***

(0.253)

Burundi

0.061

(0.184)

Cape Verde

-1.598***

(0.211)

Ghana

-0.804*** (0.055)

Kenya

0.625***

Lesotho

-1.158*** (0.023)

Liberia

-0.336*** (0.100)

Malawi

0.726*** (0.039)

Mali

0.439*** (0.062)

Mauritius

-0.734*** (0.269

Bolivia

0.177

(0.111)

Brazil

0.437*** (0.080)

Chile

-0.254*** (0.051)

Colombia

0.100

(0.169)

Costa Rica

-0.006

(0.196)

Dominican Republic

0.144

(0.100)

(0.050)
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El Salvador

-0.038

(-0.038)

Guatemala

0.293*** (0.045)

Honduras

-0.062

(0.084)

Mexico

0.228***

(0.057)

Nicaragua

-1.914*** (0.546)

Panama

Constant

5.554*** (0.349)

Observations
15,220

17,899

R2
0.366

0.240

Adjusted R2

0.239

Residual Std. Error
15194)
F Statistic
= 25; 15194)

0.893 (df = 17873)
226.247*** (df = 25; 17873)

0.365
0.741 (df =
350.177*** (df

===============================================================================
============
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

